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中国目前面临的挑战是如何振兴二十国集团（G20），将其打造为一个规模虽小却更专注于维护世界秩序的机构。尤其是在当下，联合国虽然包容性强，但机构沉闷，缺乏活力，而七国集团（G7）又在不断被边缘化。
为了达成这一目标，中国必须：
顶住美国及其盟友对中国经济发展理念和冲突解决方式的攻击，发挥有效的领导作用；反对美国及其盟友的炮舰外交，和美国建立切实的合作关系，维护中国的领土主权和经济利益；制定对策，阐述“一带一路”倡议和本国领土主张；扩大区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP）影响，以替代濒临破产的跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）。
不论是从政治还是经济的角度来看，G20集团内部分歧都源自三个不同群体（发达国家、新兴市场、发展中国家）对于话语权、需求和权力的不同诉求。
发达国家的经济下滑已经持续多年。中下阶层的通胀调整收入跟半个世纪以前持平，而仅占1%的富豪阶层的收入却在成倍增长。恐惧和不满情绪蔓延，贸易保护主义、孤立主义、宗派主义，甚至仇外心理高涨。同时，金融市场和金融机构不断爆发丑闻，追求快钱投机，失去立足的根本。
以金砖国家为代表的新兴市场，虽然不断遭受挫折，但也已不再满足于屈居美国之后。他们努力增强政治和经济优势，希望在国际谈判桌上争得发言权。这些国家的GDP占全球经济总量的23%，人口占全球53%，他们的利益诉求和发达国家不同。
发展中国家多数面临执政危机，对基础设施投资和人道主义救援有极大的需求。这使他们逐渐把目光从美国的自由民主资本主义转向中国宏观调控下的市场经济体制。即使中国近几年“增速下降”，但6.6%的增长速度仍使中国成为一个强有力的经济榜样。
在国内及世界媒体眼中，美国与中国之间的较量早已开始。如今，美国早已不是唯一的霸主，一场利益和挑战的多边角逐正在上演。
在经济上，发达国家在不断变化的竞争态势中步履蹒跚，中国等新兴市场的竞争力却越来越强。发达国家的社保制度无以为继，民主政治软弱无力，一切推动经济结构性改革的努力也都以失败告终。
在依赖资源出口的发展中国家和新兴市场中，中国的高速发展引发资源供应链的扩张，造成资源所有权的整合，因此这些国家有望在下一经济周期中获利。
在中国、东南亚和印度等经济高速发展地区，热钱流入和基础设施投资带来的就业和经济增长已经引发关注。由于基础设施的匮乏，发展中国家无法把产品推向市场，缺少公路、铁路、港口、机场、饮用水、排水系统和可靠能源使得这些国家发展缓慢。未来五年中，亚洲基础设施的需求超过8万亿美元。忽略非洲和南美不计，全球的需求是13万亿美元。根据经济乘数效应的理论，每花费1万亿美元将产生3万亿美元的效益。以此推算，在基础设施领域每投资1万亿美元，全球年度GDP将增长5%。
2008年，我质疑过G20集团的作用，因为在美国市场崩溃时，G20集团只发了一份不温不火的联合声明。
现在回头看，其实在当时的情况下，靠20国财长解决问题是不太可能的，因为这场金融危机不仅暴露了一系列巨大的庞氏骗局，把整个发达世界的金融产业都拖下了水，后来还余波不断，牵扯出更多的恶意操作行为。
如今，又过去了8年，世界经济、政治、社会结构却比冷战时期更加松散。二战后形成的国际机构，如国际货币基金组织、世界银行、亚洲开发银行、联合国、世界贸易组织等日渐衰退；而美国在政治、军事、经济、文化等领域的单极主导地位也逐步让位于以中国快速发展为核心、以亚洲为主导的多极格局。
如今，世界正处在不断变化的格局当中。虽然美国资源丰富，并长期一家独大，但如今只能勉强维持，它将以中国为中心的新兴经济体的崛起视为威胁。每天，我们都能看到现实版肥皂剧在各大国际媒体上演。截至目前，美国一直在模仿一战前英国对德国的做法，试图借助同盟遏制中国。然而，众所周知，这不会有什么好结果。
新兴的多极世界格局正日渐成形。在杭州峰会这样的中国时刻即将到来之际，中国政府应当采取主动，推动基础设施发展在全球范围内达成共识，为自己的商品和服务挖掘更广阔的市场。中国应当阐述其处理领土和贸易争端的理念，并且向世界表明，它所提出的贸易和发展建议、互不干涉的原则和达成共识的模式，不只适用于过去，也将有助于未来。
（作者：埃纳尔·唐恩（Einar Tangen），美国I-MCF董事会主席、央视时事评论员）
Hangzhou G20, a China Moment By Einar Tangen
Lead: With the established global world order looking increasingly shaky, China could seize momentum and help generate stability with the upcoming G20 Summit in Hangzhou.
The G20 Hangzhou Summit will take place in the midst of rising global political, military, economic and cultural tensions. Tensions are as much a product of changing political, economic paradigms, as they are about clashing national interests.
Beijing's challenge will be to revive and reinvigorate the G20 into an organization that can be a smaller and more focused forum for world order, than the inclusive but ponderous United Nations, or the increasingly irrelevant G7.
To accomplish this Beijing must:
Demonstrate it can play an effective leadership role, in the face of any efforts by Washington or its allies to undermine its new means and methods for economic development and conflict resolution.
Figure out a working relationship with Washington, which does not involve gunboat diplomacy and proxy attacks by the US or its allies, on China's sovereign and economic interests.
Decide how it will handle the contradictions between its “Belt and Road” initiative and its territorial posture.
Reinvigorate and implement the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), as an alternative to the faltering Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Politically and economically, the tensions within the G20 involve three distinct groups-- developed, emerging and developing nations, and are about voices, needs and power.
Developed nations have been sliding sideways economically for years. Middle and lower class inflation adjusted incomes are at the same levels they were almost a half century ago, while the wealth of the top 1% has grown exponentially. While fear and discontent pushes protectionism, isolationism, sectarianism and Xenophobia, the financial markets and the institutions are mired in scandals and increasingly ignore their real market purposes, in favor of quick money speculation.
Emerging nations, like the BRICS, despite setbacks, are no longer content to play second fiddle to a mono-polar US. They are looking to advance their political and economic interests and want a say at the global bargaining table. With over 23% of the world's GDP and over 53% of its population, they have different interests from the developed nations they sell their resources and goods. For China in particular, there is an interest in emerging and developing countries as markets for their goods and services.
Developing nations, beset with governance issues, starved for infrastructure investment and humanitarian aid, are less prone to see the Washington Consensus, or the American Exceptionalism based on liberal democratic capitalism, as a model they can emulate and are turning their gazes increasingly to China's centrally-guided and individually-motivated system. Even in light of China's "slow down," China's dramatic rise and 6.6% growth rate, is a powerful model.
The visible edge of this political battle is being played out, in the domestic and global media, as a contest between the US and China. The reality is that the world is no longer a mono-polar monopoly of the US, but an emerging multi-polar reality with competing interests and challenges.
Economically, developed countries are faltering due to changing competitive dynamics; there is more competition from emerging nations like China, for markets. Unsustainable social benefit programs and the political inability of democracies to push through needed economic structural reforms have failed to address these issues.
In developing and emerging nations depending on resource export, China's massive growth distended the supply chains for resources, resulting in a consolidation of resource ownership, a fact which is poising them for profit during the next economic cycle.
In high growth areas like China, Southeast Asia and India, there are concerns about hot money flows and the need for infrastructure investments to drive job creation and growth. The want of infrastructure is the reason that developing nations, which could feed themselves and export the rest, see their products rot before they can get to market. Lack of roads, rail, ports, airports, potable water, sewers and reliable energy are holding these countries back. The need for infrastructure in Asia alone is over US$ 8 trillion and worldwide US$ 13 trillion over the next five years, a figure which glosses over the needs of Africa and South America. The economic multiplier for an additional US$ 1 trillion in infrastructure, estimated to be US$ 3 trillion for every US$ 1 trillion spent, would increase yearly world GDP by more than 5%.
In 2008, I questioned the usefulness of the G20, which despite sober hopes, managed only a lukewarm joint statement of principles, in reaction to the U.S. market meltdown.
It seemed improbable that a group of 20 finance ministers, no matter how well intentioned, or how urgent the need, could address a financial crisis which had exposed a massive Ponzi scheme. The scheme was an indictment of the entire developed world's financial industries. Unfortunately, that has not stopped, as continuing revelations about manipulations by major players indicate.
Eight years later, the world is more economically, politically and socially fragmented than it has been since the height of the Cold War. The structures put in place after WWII, the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization are showing their age. In the meantime, America's political, military, economic and cultural mono-polar dominance is slowly giving way to a multi-polar reality, highlighted by a rising Asia centering around China's development.
Today, the world faces a changing paradigm, previously mono-polar U.S. is trying to retain its spheres of influence. It perceives the rising tide of emerging economies, at the center of which is China, as a threat to its previous areas of influence. Each day we see the real life soap opera played out in the international media; so far the US has been copying Great Britain's strategy with Germany, prior to WWI, by trying to contain China using proxies and alliances. As we know, it did not end well.
The emerging multi-polar world is still taking shape. For this to be a China Moment, Beijing will have to take the initiative in Hangzhou and start outlining a consensus process for how to drive infrastructure development worldwide, as a means of creating markets that can afford its goods and services. It will have to internally resolve its ideas of territory and trade, and Beijing will have to indicate how its trade and development proposals, non-intervention and consensus models are the future not just the past.
EinarTangen is now an economic and political affairs author and commentator.